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Fantasy, Celebrity, and Homicide
Thomas Morawetz*
Introduction
One of the most disturbing aspects of the murder trial of Orenthal
James Simpson, the defendant's status as a celebrity, is the least discussed.
Both scholarly and journalistic commentators are rightly preoccupied with
the effects of race, gender, and publicity on the effort to achieve justice.
These issues, however, are not unique to this trial and are familiar
concerns of observers (and participants) in many legal contexts, reflecting
general concerns about the gap between our practices and our ideals.
Attitudes toward race and gender present both practical and theoretical
obstacles to justice. As a practical matter, one may question whether the
performance of significant actors (judges, jurors, attorneys) is distorted by
bias and prejudice. As a theoretical concern, one may ask whether any
understanding of the circumstances leading to the trial and of the trial itself
is uncolored by partiality and perspective. Concerns about publicity, on
the other hand, tend to be purely practical and focus on how public
scrutiny affects the performance of all actors. Common law courts in
Canada and England, mindful of these dangers, bar coverage that is
constitutionally safeguarded under our own Constitution.1
Although cases that prompt reflection about racial assumptions, gender
roles and expectations, and the distorting effects of publicity are common,
celebrity trials are much less so. Simpson's celebrity status is of a special
kind. He is not the kind of celebrity defendant, such as Patricia Hearst,
John Gotti or Adolph Eichmann, who owes his notoriety to involvement
in crime. Nor is he known as a political or business figure, like Clark
Clifford or Leona Helmsley. O.J. Simpson's fame, insofar as it anteceded
his murder trial, is more directly tied to our imagination than to our
* The author is the Tapping Reeve Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of
Connecticut School of Law. The author wishes to thank Robert Clark for his help in
researching and editing this article.
1. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON AND ANDREw G.L. NICOL, MEDIA LAW (2d ed. 1990);
PATRICK BIRINSHAW,.GOVERNMENT AND INFORMATION passim (1990).
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institutions. Both as sports hero and as movie actor, he has been the
subject of special narratives and the object of publicly shared fantasies.
There is no inherent reason why the murder trial of a sports he-
ro/movie star cannot achieve procedural and substantive justice.2 But the
Simpson trial offers special obstacles and opportunities for subverting the
kind of ideal scenario of fairness and impartiality to which the rules and
practices of criminal law aspire. The most obvious reason for this, the
particular celebrity of the defendant, is also the most subtle. In the four
main parts of this paper, I shall trace the paradoxical implications of trying
someone who is famous as a subject of many kinds of fantasies (parts I and
II), consider the truth-eliciting mission of a criminal trial and the role of
attorneys as agents of the court in light of these implications (part HI), and
sketch the jurisprudential implications of this predicament: the pursuit by
the court of a master narrative of discrete events in the face of an
explosion of seductive narrative possibilities (part IV).
I. Star-gazing
Most defendants in widely-publicized trials, from Captain Dreyfus3 to
Jean Harris4, owe their notoriety to the events that precipitate the trial
itself. Their alleged criminality is the reason for their fame. Other
defendants may be public figures long before they are tried, but their
activity as public figures is continuous with the subject matter of their
alleged criminality. This is as true of Clark Clifford as it is of John Gotti.
But it is not true of 0. J. Simpson.
The activities for which Simpson had been best known were not merely
discontinuous with murder in the obvious sense that he was not seen as a
man disposed to criminal violence and murderous passions. They were
2. Consider, however, the observations of former Los Angeles District Attorney Ira
Reiner: "It is always extremely difficult to convict a celebrity. It is more difficult to
convict someone who is a hero. Before a lot of this, O.J. Simpson was an authentic
American Hero, an icon." Andrew Blum, O.J. Will Walk, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 10, 1994,
at 1, A24.
Making the same point in more flowery language, Lewis Lapham observes, in regard
to 0. J. Simpson's would-be flight from justice in his Ford Bronco, "the reverent crowds
gathering under the eucalyptus trees on Sunset Boulevard had come to pay homage to what
passes in late-twentieth-century America for the presence of divinity. The question of
Simpson's guilt or innocence wasn't as important as his descent from the starry heavens
of network television-a demigod on the order of the doomed Orestes in flight from the
pursuing Furies." Lewis H. Lapham, Terms of Endearment, 289 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 7,
7 (1994).
3. Roughly one hundred years after its occurrence, the Dreyfus affair remains one of
the most discussed trials of all time. See MICHAEL BRUNS, DREYFUS: A FAMILY AFFAIR
(1991); RICHARD GRIFFITHS, THE USE OF ABUSE: THE POLEMICS OF THE DREYFUS
AFFAIR AND ITS AFTERMATH (1991).
4. See DIANA TRILLING, MRS. HARRIS: THE DEATH OF THE SCARSDALE DIET DOCTOR
(1981); SHANA ALEXANDER, VERY MUCH A LADY (1983).
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also discontinuous in the deeper sense that, as a sports hero and movie
star, he has been a figure of fantasy rather than reality, a central player in
artificial public dramas of recreation and imagination.
In drawing implications from this fact, we must first distinguish sports
fantasies from movie fantasies. Sports heroes deploy real skills in real
time, and they play roles in their own name. A significant part of their
achievement is not a matter of pretense, of assuming an artificial and
temporary persona. But, at the same time, sports would not be central to
our collective consciousness if they were not a focus and vehicle of
fantasies. It hardly needs to be said that persons experience victory and
defeat vicariously through sports, and that they idealize and demonize
players.
The "halo effect,"' according to social psychologists, is the tendency
to presume that heroes in one domain are heroes in all. Sports heroes
become role models. Fans seek to emulate not only their success on the
playing field but also their presumed success in life as well. In doing so,
fans tend to resist counterevidence that sports heroes have the same
failings, inconsistencies, and complexities that bedevil mere mortals.
While movie stars are also valued for real skills, these skills are
inherently ones of simulation and pretense. Unlike sports heroes, they do
not have a single persona characterized by genuine victories. Fans are
more comfortable with them adopting multiple personae that are explicitly
artificial. Movie stars are the agents through which audiences engage in
fantasy. Even though failure to distinguish actors from their roles may be
a sign of naivete, all of us to some extent experience actors as their parts.
To do otherwise is to forego the suspension of disbelief that is considered
essential to the experience of movies and plays.6
The seductive confusion of actor with role is especially likely when the
heroism of a charismatic sports star is transposed to the movies. Imputed
superhumanity is carried over intact, as the movie persona spends the
psychological capital earned in the sports career. In the instance of O.J.
Simpson, this superhumanity could hardly be illustrated better than through
his role as television spokesman for Hertz car rental. In this context, his
performance implied that ordinary laws, including the law of gravity,
simply did not apply to him.7
5. A "halo effect" is "a predisposition to admire all of a person's actions, work, etc.,
because of an estimable quality or action in the past." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 863 (2d ed. 1987).
6. This idea is explored in countless books and articles. See STANLEY CAvELL, THE
WORLD VIEWED: REFLECTIONS OF THE ONTOLOGY OF FILM 25-29 (1971); PAULINE KAEL,
I LOST IT AT THE MOvIEs (1965).
7. The Hertz advertising campaign, broadcast on national television in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, depicted Simpson flying through the air into the seat of a Hertz rental car.
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Invested as we are in the fantasy lives of sports heroes and movie
stars, we are ambivalent toward the real facts of their lives. While many
persons seek gossip in fan magazines, tabloid newspapers, and television
programs, such gossip stokes the economic engines of pseudo-journalism
only when it fuels the fantasies of its audience. As a result, the gossip is
loosely, if at all, grounded in fact. Rather, it elaborates audiences'
secondary fantasies about the lives of sports heroes and movie stars,
fantasies that are constructed from the primary fantasies played out in the
sports events and movies themselves.
II. Deeper into (the Concept of) Fantasy
The notion of fantasy, as I have been using it, rests on the distinction
between fantasy and reality, or fiction and truth. The word "fantasy"
commonly has two meanings. The simpler meaning is that "fantasy"
merely refers to what is false, any claim about the life and deeds of an
individual that is at odds with fact. A more complex understanding of
"fantasy" refers to artificial personae and events. The rules of sporting
events or the scripts of movies and plays, for example, are constructed by
imagination and require audiences to use their own experiences and beliefs
to uncover meaning.'
The seemingly indispensable distinction between truth and fantasy in
this context is vulnerable to criticism and attack. Though some facts are
considered "hard," or easily resolved by observable data, such as the fact
that Jones either was or was not in Kansas City on January 1, other facts
may be a matter of endless dispute.' Attributions of motive, intention,
8. Psychologists remind us that fantasy is both an individual and a collective
experience. Thus, each of us plays out in our imaginations all kinds of ex ents that we
know are not real, imaginings that reflect our hopes, fears and anticipations. Most, but not
all of us, can tell the difference between our fantasies and reality most of the time. The
reservoir of images and stories from which we draw our fantasies has, in part, contents that
are idiosyncratic to our own history and, in larger part, contents that reflect shared cultural,
political and social experiences.
9. In the early part of the twentieth century, philosophers were much preoccupied with
the epistemological status of our knowledge of the external world, in particular with the
relationship between what I am calling hard facts and soft facts. Other ways of referring
to this distinction is in terms of brute facts and inferential facts. See BERTRAND RUSSELL,
OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD (1929); G. E. Moore, Proof of an External
World, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1959); JOHN L. POLLOCK, KNOVEDGE AND
JUSTIFICATION (1974). More recent epistemological investigations, influenced perhaps by
the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, look at all of our knowledge claims in terms of the
patterns of assumptions and justification in which they are embedded. See LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1959); HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH
A HUMAN FACE (1990).
The distinction between hard and soft facts, whatever its epistemological status may
be, is intuitively suggested by the distinction in criminal law between questions involving
acts (actus reus) and those involving mental states (mens rea). It is generally assumed that
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mood, and character are "soft," or more open to a variety of interpreta-
tions, such as whether Jones was greedy, reckless, giddy, or inhumane in
his conduct in Kansas City on January 1. With regard to these latter
"facts," one person's truth may be another person's fiction. The
distinction between hard and soft facts, however, is one of degree. In
principle, one can accumulate relevant evidence to make an ever more
convincing case about Jones' motives, intention, mood, or character. A
large part of our discourse, whether in informal conversation or in formal
trials, consists of hardening soft facts by presenting and interpreting
evidence.
Thus, the observation that some factual claims are soft does not
challenge the dichotomy between fantasy and reality, fiction and truth; it
simply takes note of the difficulties we sometimes have, and the disagree-
ments we therefore experience, in determining which is which. But a
strain of postmodern"0 reasoning represents a wholesale rejection of these
distinctions. According to this view, any so-called event can be seen and
described in endless ways, depending on the background, dispositions and
powers of the observer. Also, references to "truth" and "reality" betray
a naive faith in what can be called a "master narrative," an ideal account
of events "as they objectively are." Postmodern critics assert that there is
no master narrative, merely (potentially) conflicting individual narra-
tives. 1
From this standpoint, what we have been calling "fantasy" in its more
complex sense can be generalized to all descriptions of events and
the former can be "directly" observed while the latter are inferential. Of course, to say
that act can be directly observed is not to say that they are always or generally directly
observed; in particular cases, our claims about persons' acts are generally inferential, e.g.
from other (trustworthy) persons' reports, etc.
10. Consider the following discussion by Jean-Francois Lyotard:
A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he
writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestab-
lished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining
judgment, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work....
[I]t must be clear that it is our business [as writers] not to supply reality but
to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented.
JEAN-FRANcOIs LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE
81 (1985). "Postmodernism means the end of a single world view and, by extension, ...
a resistance to single explanations." Charles Jencks, Introduction to THE POST-MODERN
READER 7 (Charles Jencks, ed., 1992).
11. "Master narrative-how else to translate Lyotard's grand recit? ... [W]hat made
the grand recits of modernity master narratives if not the fact that they were all narratives
of mastery, of man seeking his telos in the conquest of nature? What function did these
narratives play other than to legitimize Western man's self-appointed mission of
transforming the entire planet in his own image? ... What is at stake, then, is not only
the status of narrative, but of representation itself." Craig Owens, The Discourse of Others:
Feminist and Postmodernism, in THE POST-MODERN READER 339 (Charles Jencks ed.,
1992).
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experiences. Everyone from the politician speaking to her constituents and
posturing in Congress to the corporate executive planning a marketing
strategy to the professor of law presiding over a class is playing a role,
acting a fantasy that is not significantly different from the roles of movie
actors. Attempts by observers to pin down the reality of the politician's
life are bound to be frustrated and to collapse into a set of competing
narratives, each one vulnerable to the allegation that it is merely that
person's own fantasy.12 In this sense, what we are accustomed to doing
overtly in thinking about actors and sports heroes is what we do covertly
in all of our considerations of the lives of others. We are all actors and
storytellers at all times.
III. Trial, Truth, and Fantasy
I shall postpone until part IV any consideration of the merits of the
postmodern reduction of truth and reality to fiction and fantasy and its
critique of the "myth" of an elusive master narrative. In this part, I shall
consider how a postmodern account plays havoc with the bases of legal
practice, specifically with the process of trying criminal cases.
The practice of criminal law cannot dispense with the notion of truth.
Although eliciting truth is only one of several goals of a trial, and although
some aspects of trial conduct may consciously subvert the search for truth,
few would deny that the job of the jury is to distinguish truth from
falsehood. This job extends equally to both soft and hard facts, i.e., to
questions of intent as well as questions of action. 3
The adversarial roles of criminal attorneys, as prosecution and defense,
are only partially defined by the pursuit of truth. One familiar, although
widely disputed, justification for the adversarial system is that it is an
efficient vehicle for eliciting truth. 4 Within the system, however,
attorneys are only required to be truthful in certain ways, e.g. by the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 5 Model Rule 3.4 (e) of Profes-
12. "[Language] can never explain the world, or at least, when it claims to explain the
world, it does so only the better to conceal its ambiguity." Roland Barthes, Authors and
Writers, in A BARTHES READER 187 (Susan Sontag ed., 1982). In a series of essays,
Barthes applies the notion to virtually every area of cultural, political and social experience.
See Roland Barthes, MYTHOLOGIES (1973).
13. See supra note 9.
14. The effectiveness of the adversary system as a vehicle for eliciting truth is one of the
most fundamentally disputed issues in legal ethics. Monroe Freedman is one of the most
single-minded defenders of the adversary system on those grounds. See MONROE
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 28-33 (1990). His critics are numerous.
See DAvID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 50-103 (1988); Marvin Frankel, The Search
for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
15. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were approved by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association in 1983. A significant majority of the states have adopted
some version of the Model Rules; all have modified the text as adopted by the ABA.
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sional Conduct mandates that "[a lawyer shall not], in trial, allude to any
matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will
not be supported by admissible evidence."16 Further, according to Model
Rule 3.3 (a)(4), "[a lawyer shall not knowingly] offer evidence the lawyer
knows to be false."17 Finally, according to Model Rule 3.4 (b), "[a
lawyer shall not] falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify
falsely."8
A layperson is likely to interpret these provisions differently from a
lawyer. The former would find in them a broad mandate for lawyers at
trial to work together in eliciting the truth. It would seem at odds with a
lawyer's task, for example, to try to persuade the jury to consider and
believe an account of the relevant facts that the attorney believes to be
false. Having first distinguished to her own satisfaction fact from fiction,
a lawyer would then be required to assemble evidence for a narrative that
is in accord with the truth.
In fact, both laypersons and lawyers may recognize this account of a
lawyer's conduct as naive. Laypersons, informed by journalists and legal
fiction, interpret lawyers' rhetorical devices as calculated to advantage their
clients' stories in ways that betray the obvious mandate of the Model
Rules. Lawyers, on the other hand, argue that laypersons read the Rules
too broadly. The rules do prohibit introduction of certain facts, such as
a witness' marital history, when they are not relevant, and require that
lawyers present evidentiary support for any claim they want the jury to
believe. But the Rule does not demand congruence between the lawyer's
own beliefs about relevant events and the account she will ask the jury to
believe. 9 Similarly, Rules 3.3 (a) (4) and 3.4 (b) prohibit the introduc-
tion of material evidence or testimony that the lawyer knows to be false.
The lawyer, for example, may not submit a piece of clothing as belonging
to the defendant when she knows it does not, and she may not introduce
testimony that includes deliberate lies.' The Rules do not prohibit her,
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
16. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (e) (1983).
17. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (a)(4) (1983).
18. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (b) (1983).
19. Indeed, many experts on the role of the criminal defense attorney suggest that the
only way of testing the strength of the prosecution's case is by asking the jury to consider
alternative scenarios. Doing so is part of the defense attorney's obligation, according to
this view, and it is irrelevant whether or not she believes the stories she constructs. See
FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at chs. 2, 5.
20. It is well settled that Rule 3.3 (a)(4) prohibits the use of perjured testimony. The
Comment to Rule 3.3, however, notes that "the most difficult situation ... arises in a
criminal case where the accused insists on testifying when the lawyer knows that the
testimony is perjurious." The Comment critically discusses various controversial
"resolutions of this dilemma" and concludes that "if withdrawal will not remedy the
situation or is impossible, the advocate should make disclosure [of the fact of perjury] to
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however, from using genuine evidence or true statements in a deceptive
way, a way that leads the jury to infer that which she personally believes
to be false.
Accordingly, the Model Rules allow lawyers more latitude than is
apparent from an untutored reading. To be sure, lawyers and scholars
differ with regard to the proper use of that latitude.21 Some argue that
the lawyer's own beliefs about the truth are irrelevant to the accounts that
she may legitimately develop for the jury in the defense of her client:'
"defense counsel has no ... obligation to ascertain or present the truth.
Our system assigns him a different mission ... preventing the conviction
of the innocent .... If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one,...
that will be the normal course."I
Others argue for narrower constraints. In a widely cited and discussed
article, for example, Harry Subin criticizes lawyers who are "prepared to
stand before the jury posing as an officer of the court in search of the
truth, while trying to fool the jurors into believing a wholly fabricated
story."'24 He sees as disingenuous the suggestion that "the lawyer cannot
possibly be sufficiently certain of the truth to impose his or her view of it
on the client's case."2s
Proponents of the view that defense attorneys are not tethered to the
truth-seeking process and function instead "to put the State to its proof, to
put the State's case in its worst possible light,"' may execute that role
in different ways. First, they may cast doubt on the State's account by
showing that acts and events can be seen in more than one way or that
witnesses may be mis-remembering or dissembling. Second, they may
construct alternative scenarios and make the argument that the outcome (in
the Simpson case, the deaths of the victims) is the result of a wholly
independent set of actions. They may, in other words, construct
alternative stories.z7
the court."
21. William Simon offers a useful general discussion of lawyers' "tactics that cannot
plausibly be viewed either as assisting the trier in making an informed determination or as
vindicating specific intrinsic procedural rights." See William H. Simon, The Ethics of
Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703 (1993).
22. See Simon H. Rifkind, The Lawyer's Role and Responsibility in Modern Society, 30
THE RECORD 534 (1975).
23. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
24. Harry I. Subin, he Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 125, 148 (1987).
25. Id.
26. Wade, 388 U.S. at 257-58 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
27. An interesting empirical study of the ways in which juries can be led to disregard
evidence, to presume the existence of evidentiary support when little exists, and to be
mislead in other ways is presented in Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped
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To what extent must alternative stories of that kind be grounded in
evidence? As defense attorneys construct such stories, how is the mandate
of 3.4 (e) satisfied? Consider two different ways that these scenarios may
be related to the evidence. Model Rule 3.4 (e) anticipates a standard
situation in which the relationship is one of plausibility. The jury is asked
to consider whether the story is plausible in light of the evidence, whether
the story is the most plausible account, beyond reasonable doubt, of all
available accounts.'
A different relationship between stories and evidence is that of logical
consistency. By this much weaker standard, the jury is asked whether any
evidence is logically incompatible with the offered account or, alternative-
ly, whether they are consistent with each other. Logical consistency is the
weakest possible kind of relationship, and an indefinite array of implausi-
ble stories may all be consistent with available evidence. To the extent
that there is slippage from a higher standard of plausibility to merely one
of consistency, the jury's role is radically changed. The jury may come
to operate under the assumption that all stories consistent with the evidence
are to be considered equally seriously and are presumptively equally
plausible.29
One may see the conduct of Simpson's defense attorneys from this
perspective. In raising the possibility that a premeditated and comprehen-
sive police conspiracy underlies the established facts of the case,3" and
in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 687 (1990).
28. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution has been held to require "proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged." In re Winship,
397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970). Model Rule 3.4 (e) refers, of course, not to the standard that
the jury must use in evaluating the evidence, but to the minimal requirements the lawyer
must satisfy in presenting the case.
29. The situation that I am criticizing, the conceptual move from a standard of
knowledge involving plausibility to one involving logical inconsistency, has long been
familiar in philosophical discussions of skepticism. A typical skeptical dilemma raises the
question of how one knows that one is not dreaming or hallucinating. The suggestion is
that any evidence one seeks is equally impeachable in the light of the hypothesis that one
is dreaming or hallucinating. Accordingly, all evidence is logically consistent with that
hypothesis. The skeptic concludes that, as a result, one has no justification for rejecting
the hypothesis-and must therefore entertain it as a serious alternative to the belief that one
is awake or not hallucinating.
The flaw in this argument is the last step: the inference from logical consistency to
equal plausibility-the idea, in other words, that one must entertain the hypothesis merely
because it is logically consistent with what one knows: "we are just in one of the
characteristic situations of philosophical skepticism: which allows us the alternatives of
meaning something different from what we do mean, or of being forever unsure; because
the standard for being sure while meaning what we do mean is set self-contradictorily
high." P. F. STRAWSON, INDIvIDuALS 34 (1959).
30. For a brief and scathing discussion of the implausibility of this hypothesis and of the
popularity of conspiracy theories in general, see Bruce Handy, A Conspiracy of Dunces,
TIME, May 22, 1995, at 82.
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raising the alternative possibility that the murders are the consequences of
drug-dealing by friends of the victims, they are saying that these scenarios
are consistent with what is known. Plausibility, in the form of independent
evidence that establishes the likelihood of these scenarios, seems of
secondary concern-or of no concern at all.
Given this methodological shift, defense attorneys may see themselves
as licensed to lead the jury through the domains of fantasy with scenarios
drawn not from the world of common experience but the world of movie
plots and tabloid speculation. In promulgating these suggestions, they may
assume that our standards (and the jury's standards) for considering these
accounts have merged with the standards that we entertain when we
entertain ourselves. The search for truth becomes a search for the most
exciting or arousing account that is consistent with the known facts. It is
bizarrely appropriate that Simpson, as the creature of two separate worlds
of fantasy, sports and movies, continues (in the scenarios of his defense
attorneys) to inhabit these domains.
These apparent shifts in defense strategy can be seen in two ways. On
one hand, one may argue that they merely represent the logical implica-
tions of strategies that artful defense attorneys often use. Accordingly, the
devolution of defense scenarios from consideration of truth to comparative
fantasies should be recognized as a constant temptation for defense
attorneys. This case would be unusual only to the extent that it also
happens to reflect the pre-existing background of this defendant and the
unconscious expectations of the public. On the other hand, one may see
the exploitation of movie-based fantasies by the defense team as a
deliberate and cynical strategy designed to take advantage of Simpson's
image and of the general suspension of critical judgment with which sports
heroes, movie stars, and other totems of gossip are typically regarded.
IV. Truth, Narrative, and Perspective
We saw above that many postmodern theorists argue that the
distinction between truth and fantasy is naive and exists only to be
deconstructed. According to this account, the cultural artifacts that we
label "fiction" or "fantasy" differ only in degree from the narratives that
make up our shared experience of history, politics or law. The latter
domains, like the former, consist only of multiple competing narratives
that are shared and debated within large or small interpretive communities.
We have also seen that this critique wreaks havoc on the assumptions
that make criminal trials possible." This critique implies that the basic
31. Any attempt to justify the presentation of multiple fantasies, e.g., those involving
police conspiracies or wars among drug dealers, as multiple competing narratives in this
case represents, of course, vulgarization and abuse of the underlying theory of
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instruction to a jury, to arrive at a decision about the truth of legally
relevant events, is inherently misconceived. The mandate to juries
presupposes that there is a master narrative that is "true" and that the
juries' role is to find that master narrative.
In the Simpson trial, doubts about a master narrative would be
emphasized by the view that jurors, lawyers and observers bring their own
experiences and assumptions to bear on the situation. The variant readings
that individuals give to the evidence and other observations, and the
various narratives that they are disposed to tell and find persuasive, can be
deconstructed in light of their personal histories and beliefs. Doing so
involves seeing them both as individuals and as members of particular
racial groups, genders and social classes. No group is inherently without
presuppositions.
A consequence of this deconstructive approach is that any resolution
of this trial will be seen as irreducibly political and will be explained in
terms of the vindication of certain political biases and the defeat of others.
Insofar as participants and observers come to reject any clear distinction
between truth and fantasy, the only test of a narrative is the pragmatic one
of whether it wins adherents. Any narrative that is likely to win adherents
becomes admissible. In this sense, Simpson is an exemplary postmodern
defendant, carrying with him an array of available roles in the popular
imagination.
Obviously, the mode of analysis that I have called "deconstructive" is,
and is intended to be, subversive because it makes unavailable (or at least
encumbers seriously) the notion of truth and seems to erase substantially
the distinction between presuppositions of judgment and outright bias.
Each of these jeopardized notions is essential to the way we think of legal
processes, specifically of litigation, and the roles of lawyers, judges, and
jurors. Thus, jurors must believe that there is one true, one veridical,
account (a master narrative) of the relevant events, and that it is their job
to determine it. Although they may and should recognize that the process
of judgment has presuppositions, they must at the same time seek to free
themselves of bias.32
The postmodern challenge to the objectivist epistemological premises
of our legal procedures implicates the deepest concerns of contemporary
postmodernism. Theorists who reject the idea of a master narrative surely do not believe
that the process of trying to determine the relevant "hard facts" is, in principle,
misconceived and must be aborted. They do not deny that the identity of the assailant of
Nicole Brown and Ronald Goldman is a question of fact rather than a matter of
interpretation, dependent on the assumptions of the interpreter. Rather, they might argue
that such questions, such as whether racism seriously tainted the police investigation,
cannot be answered objectively. See supra text accompanying notes 10 through 12.
32. Observers will, of course, disagree about the extent to which this is possi-
ble-disagree, that is, about underlying features of human nature.
legal theory. It is impossible to do justice to them in so brief a discussion,
just as it is difficult to avoid caricaturing the positions at issue. Nonethe-
less, the postmodern approach is clearly echoed by some critical legal
theorists, including some critical feminist and race theorists.33 These
writers draw attention both to the pervasiveness with which unacknowl-
edged bias and unquestioned presumptions permeate legal, social and
political discourse and to the lack of shared criteria for distinguishing mere
narratives from a master narrative, for distinguishing mere beliefs from
truth.14
For present purposes, perhaps it is enough to distinguish two different
roles that these critical approaches to law can have, one of them salutary
and the other destructive. The salutary role is that of demanding vigilance
on the part of each actor and each observer in questioning her presupposi-
tions and ferreting out her biases. Similarly, critical thinking suggests that
we must be cautious in elevating our own narratives, our own way of
assembling relevant facts into a master narrative and calling it "truth."
Thus, critical thinking emphasizes that presumption-free inquiry is an
incoherent notion, whereas bias-free inquiry is an ideal.
These reminders are not revolutionary and subversive but are merely
restatements of the parameters of rational discourse, principles that we
have always known. They do not undermine the processes of trial but
instead reinforce them and make them possible. In this sense, they must
33. Consider, for example, the following observations by a leading feminist theorist:
Feminist analysis begins with the principle that objective reality is a myth
.... The business of living and progressing within our disciplines requires
that we give up on 'objective' verification at various critical moments, such
as when we rely upon gravity, or upon the existence of others, or upon the
principle of verification itself. Feminism insists upon epistemological and
psychological sophistication in law: Jurisprudence will forever be stuck in
a postrealist battle of subjectivities, with all the discomfort that has
represented.
Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1378,
1400-1401, (1986).
The apparent abandonment by some critical theorists of the notion of objectivity in
shared discourse has prompted some observers to suggest that critical legal studies imply
"the death of law." Owen Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1986).
Fiss substantially modified his indictment in a later work. See Owen Fiss, The Law
Regained, 74 CORNELL L. Rv. 245 (1988).
34. These observations derive some of their impact from ambiguity. It is important, for
example, to distinguish presuppositions from biases. Reasoning without presupposition is
impossible; every instance of reasoning presupposes some beliefs and convictions that are
accepted without question. Bias-free reasoning, on the other hand, is a desirable and
realizable goal, if biases are seen as beliefs and presuppositions that are unjustifiable.
Similarly, the conclusion that one cannot arrive at a so-called "master narrative," namely
an account of an event or series of events that is objective and that is the mirror of
"reality," does not in itself put in question the project of comparing narratives as better or
worse in terms of articulated criteria, among which may be the bias-free ideal.
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be distinguished from the genuinely revolutionary, genuinely subversive
notion that the effort to distinguish presupposition from bias, truth from
fiction, reality from fantasy, is doomed. The latter suggestion is that we
must treat all narratives as equally suspect and therefore all narratives as
equally legitimate. This notion is one that we entertain at our peril and
that, in the end, we have no good reason to accept. In the Simpson trial,
the responsibilities of all participants-the accused, the jurors, the
attorneys, the judge, and all commentators-must be defined in terms of
discovering the difference between fantasy and reality and acting
accordingly.

